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Sales: Gift of Bulk Goods as a Fraudulent Conveyance Within
the Purview of the Washington Bulk Sales Act-The Defendant,
retail merchant had possession of property under an unrecorded con-
ditional sales contract when he borrowed money from the plaintiff for
use in his business. Subsequently the Defendant transferred the busi-
ness without apparent consideration to his father. The father trans-
ferred the assets of the business to a partnership in which father was
a co-partner. In neither transfer was an affidavit of creditors de-
manded, and hence not filed' as required by the Bulk Sales Act of
Washington.2 The Plaintiff, unable to obtain repayment of his loan,
secured judgment thereon, and proceeded to enforce said judgment
with a garnishment action against the Defendant and the subsequent
transferees. The Trial Court gave judgment for the Plaintiff and the
Defendants appealed. Held: Judgment modified and affirmed. The
gratuitous transfer of goods in bulk is a transfer within the purview
of the bulk sales act. The BonaFide Purchaser for Value from the
gratuitous transferee, however, is not personally liable for the value
of the property received. Hull v. Minkler, - Wash. - 319 P. 2d 815
(1958).
The Defendants maintained that compliance with the Bulk Sales
Act was not necessary because the Plaintiff was not a creditor 3 and
the transfer was not within the purview of the Bulk Sales Law be-
cause there was no sale. The court examined the Washington Bulk
Sales Statute in detail in order to determine the meaning of the word
"transfer" therein. "Bulk sale", under the Washington Statute, is
defined as "any sale, exchange or transfer, or attempted sale, exchange,
or transfer . . ."4 "Sale" denotes a passing of property from one to
1 Three states follow the CONNECTICUT STATUTE §6705 (1949) requiring filing in
addition to notice. They are California, CIv. CALIF. CODE §3440 (1955),
Arizona, ARiz. REv. STATUTES §44-1021 (1956), Washington, R. C. W. 63.08(1956). Washington originally followed the Connecticut form but now re-
quires the buyer to give the proceeds to creditors like the Pennslyvania form.
However, the notice requirement remains in the Connecticut form.
2 R. C. W. §63.08 (1956).
3 The Washington court, without discussion, said where the money was for use
in his business, he was a creditor under the act. "As a general rule creditors
are not limited to creditors for merchandise or fixtures or other property
purchased by the merchant for the conduct of the business, or for money
loaned for the purposes of carrying on the particular business but they include
all creditors of the sellers regardless of how the debt arose, including general
creditors in transactions other than those involving the business sold." 37
C.J.S. Fraudulent Conveyances §479 (1943).
4 R. C. W. §63.08010. "Any sale, exchange or transfer, or attempted sale,
exchange or transfer, of all or substantially all of a stock of goods, wares
or merchandise, or all or substantially all of the fixtures and equipment used
in and about the business of a vendor engaged in the business of buying and
selling and dealing in goods, wares, or merchandise of any description, or in
the business of operating a restaurant, cafe, beer parlor, tavern, hotel, club,
or gasoline service station, made out of the usual and ordinary course of
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another for a price or consideration. "Exchange" denotes a passing
of property for other property. "Transfer" is any act by which
property of one is vested in another, whether by sale, gift or otherwise.
The court reasoned the word "transfer" was superfluous if the legis-
lature intended to encompass only transfer for value. In such case
"sale" and "exchange" would have been sufficient. 5
The Washington court rejected the dicta in Daniels v. Pacific Brew-
ing Co.6 in which the court stated that compliance was not necessary
where no purchase money passed. In the Daniels case a person in-
debted to a brewing company under a chattel mortgage of his entire
stock and fixtures executed a bill of sale for the property covered by
the mortgage without complying with the act. The court held com-
pliance was not necessary as there was no sale within the meaning
of the act.
In the various states the following words are used to describe the
transactions covered :7 sale,8 transfer,9 assignment, disposal, other dis-
position, delivery, mortgage, trade, and exchange.10 Sale and mortgage
are more definite in their legal connotation than assignment, trade,
and exchange."' Transfer, disposal, deliver and other disposition are
more vague than the foregoing and refer to some type of alienation of
property interest. Where the statute employs words which have no
established legal consent, the court has greater freedom in interpre-
tation. The question then becomes, as in the principal case, whether
business of the vendor, or the sale, exchange, or transfer or attempted sale,
exchange or transfer of substantially the entire business of buying, selling
and dealing in goods, wares, or merchandise, or of operating a restaurant,
cafe, beer parlor, tavern, hotel, club or gasoline service station conducted by
the vendor, or the sale, exchange, or transfer or attempted sale, exchange or
transfer, of the interest of the vendor in any business, shall be deemed a sale
and transfer in bulk in contemplation of this chapter."
5To support this reasoning the court cited Plass v. Morgan, 436 Wash. 160,
78 P. 784 (1904). The Plass case enunciated a liberal construction of the
statute in order to protect the creditor. The court therefore would not limit
the effect which was intended by the legislature and therefore imposed liability
on the defendant.
686 Wash. 416, 150 P. 609 (1915).
7 States using "Sale, Transfer, or Assignment" are Illinois, SMITH-HURD
STATS. Ch. 121Y2 §78 (1936), Virginia, §55-83 (1956), Wisconsin, §241.18(1955), Indiana, INDIANA STATS. §33-201 (1954), Michigan, §442.1 (1948).
Another combination of words, "Sale or Transfer" is used by Texas, Civ.
STATS. §4001 (1954) ; Georgia, CODE §23-203 (1957), uses "any sale or Trans-
fer"; Iowa, IOWA CODE §555.1 (1954), "Sales, Assignments, or Deliveries";
Missouri, REVISED STATS. §427.020 (1953) and Nebraska, REVISED STATS.
REISSUE, §36-502 (1957), "Sale, Trade or other Disposition"; Kansas, GENERAL
STATS. §58-101 (1949), "Sale or Disposal"; Oklahoma, STATS. 24 §71 (1956)
"Transfers."
s Talty v. Schoenholz, 224 Ill. App. 158, 154 N.E. 139 (1926).
9 Tipsworth v. Doss, 273 Ill. App. (1933), A "Transfer" as used in the Bulk
Sales Act is the act by which the owner of a thing delivers it to another person
with the intent of passing the right which he has in it to the latter.10 Hartung v. Rushing, 93 Ore.6, 182 P. 177, (1919).
11 Billing and Branch, Problem of Transfer under Bulk Sales Law: A Study of
Absolute Transfers, 35 MIcH. L. REV. 732 (1937).
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there is a sufficient alienation of property in a manner and for a pur-
pose within the purview of the statute. In statutes where 'transfer"
is included, legal consideration seems unimportant. It appears there-
fore such statutes impliedly embrace gifts.1 2 No other cases have
been found which hold formalities of the bulk sales law must be com-
plied with where there is a bulk gift.'3
The principal case defines transfer as "any act by which property
of one is vested in another by sale, gift, or otherwise", yet many bulk
sale acts do not apply to every transfer of goods or merchandise in
bulk. Mortgages are not automatically held to be within that meaning.14
It is only when there is no express statute covering mortgages that it
is left to the court to decide the issue of whether it is within the
statute or not. Talty v. Schoenholz,15 applying the Illinois Bulk Sales
statute, laid down the principle that sale, transfer and assignment are
to be used in their well known legal signification. They do not mean
a pledge or security for a debt. In Michigan, a "lien theory" state, a
chattel mortgage must transfer the entire title with the right to im-
mediate possession vesting in the vendee to come within the meaning
of the statute. Hannahs v. Richter Brewuing Co.' held that where the
chattel mortgage was merely to secure a debt it was not a sale, transfer,
or assignment of a stock of goods in bulk within the meaning of the
Michigan Bulk Sales Law. In many states whether a mortgage is in-
cluded or not depends on whether title passed or not.' 7 In other words,
where a mortgage is given in a "lien theory" state it is held title
doesn't pass and therefore the act does not apply while in a "title
theory" state it is held title does pass and therefore the act applies to
the transaction18 However, there are states which ignore the property
concept theory where it appears the spirit and purpose of the act are
violated. For example Texas, a "lien state", has held a mortgage void9
if notice is not given because, if not, a debtor could give preference
to a creditor and evade the purpose of the act. The Texas court would
12 Id. at 737.
'3 Day v. Grayson County State Bank, 153 S.W.2d 599 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941). A
Chattel Mortgage given to secure a valid and subsisting debt without a renewal
or extension of the debt may be gratuitous in contemplation of law.
14 Note 6 supra; McAvoy v. Jennings, 44 Wash. 79, 87 P. 53 (1906). "The
decided weight of authority is to the effect that giving of a chattel mortgage
on stock of goods for a bona fide debt does not constitute a sale, transfer or
assignment in bulk in violation of statutes forbidding such a sale or transfer
in bulk of a stock in trade otherwise than in the ordinary course of business
without certain preliminary proceedings." 9 A.L.R. 473 (1920), 14 A.L.R.
753 (1921), 57 A.L.R. 1049 (1928).
15 Note 8, supra.
16 149 Mich. 220, 112 N.W. 713 (1907).
'7 Billig and Smith, Bulk Sales Law: Transactions Covered by the Statute, 39
W.Va. L. Q. 323 (1933).18 Norton Jewelry Co. v. Maddock, 115 Kan. 108, 222 P. 113 (1924), aff'd on
reargument in 115 Kan. 574, 223 P. 816 (1924).
19 Beene v. National Liquor Co., 198 S.W. 596, (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
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not allow an attempt by a dishonest debtor to defeat the purpose of
the bulk sales act by giving a chattel mortgage instead of a bill of
sale. The court also gave general creditors protection in Kansas,2"
where it held a chattel mortgage when accompanied by a transfer of
possession to be a "sale or disposal" within the Kansas statute. An
opposite view was taken in Rhode Island, a "title" state, when the
court held a mortgage is not covered though the title passes because
the transfer is not absolute and unconditional. 21
Historically, the demand for regulation of bulk transfers arose be-
cause of fraudulent transfers wherein the unsuspecting creditor was
without recourse against the subject matter in the hands of a bonafide
purchaser for value or against the proceeds in the hands of a debtor
who had absconded.2 2 The primary purpose was to give the creditor
notice so that he could act. Legislatures recognized the acute predica-
ment of creditors and passed the bulk sales acts. Clearly it was a
protection against a bulk sale, and in the writer's opinion it is not
difficult to rationalize that the acts should also apply to bulk gifts
where the word "transfer" is used. What the results would be nation-
ally depends on the courts' construction of the statute in the light of
the intent of the legislature arrived at by looking at the particular
words in the statute22 and the policy being followed. 4
It is conceivable that had this case been decided under the Fraudu-
lent Transfer Act,25 the Washington court would have arrived at the
same decision. In Schaffer v. Stever,26 the debtor made a gift of fur-
nishings and furniture of a hotel. The court held the transfer of
property as a gift was not good as against existing creditors. How-
ever, in determining if there is a fraudulent conveyance where a gift
has been given the Plaintiff has the burden of proving intent to de-
fraud27 which is unnecessary under the Bulk Sales Act. The issue is
20 Linn County Bank v. Davis, 103 Kan. 672, 175 P. 972 (1918).
21 Aristo Hosiery Co. v. Ramsbottom, 46 R.I. 505, 129 A. 503 (1925).
22 Billig, Bulk Sales Laws: A Study in Econ. Adjustment, 77 U. Pa. L. Rev. 72
(1928).
23 VOLD, SALES, at page 408 (1931). "On behalf of the seller's creditors in novel
doubtful cases are constantly invoked the arguments in favor of a liberal
interpretation of such statutes, to carry out to the fullest their remedial
provisions designed to protect the seller's creditors by suppressing fraudulent
bulk sales in the marketing system, similarly in such new doubtful cases there
is constantly invoked on behalf of the buyer the arguments calling for strict
construction of statutes in degrogation of the common law in order to pre-
serve for the buyer so far as possible in his common law security of acqui-
sitions.
"It is by no means settled how far a liberal interpretation of such statutes
will in novel doubtful situations be adopted. Examples of strict and of liberal
interpretation of such statutes under variant acts may be found in the same
jurisdiction."
24 Note 17, supra.
22 R. C. W. §19.40010 (1956).
26 153 Wash. 116, 279 P. 390 (1929).
27 Workman v. Bryce, - Wash. -, 310 P.2d 228 (1957).
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raised whether the court should classify gift cases under the Fraudu-
lent Conveyancing Act or under the Bulk Sales Act. Clearly, a Plaintiff
would use the latter where possible.
As a matter of policy, it is the writer's opinion the court has ar-
rived at a sound conclusion, and in as much as the Wisconsin Bulk
Sale Statute s contains the word "transfer", the Wisconsin Court
should follow the principal case and include gratuitous transfers in its
statutory construction.
DOROTHY PROPSO1x
Federal Income Taxation-Nonrecognition of Gain on Sale of
Residence-Petitioner, a specialist in foreign economics, was sent
to Europe by the U.S. State Department. While there he rented his
house in Maryland. He returned to this country and took a job in
Washington. He tried to evict the tenant but was forestalled by
Federal rent regulations. Being in need of housing, he sold the house,
subject to the lease, and bought another house, which cost more than
the proceeds from the sale of the old one. The purchaser of the old
house was not able to obtain possession for six months. Petitioner did
not declare the gain on the sale as income, believing this sale fell under
Section 112(n) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. The Commis-
sioner assessed a deficiency on the ground that the old house was not
petitioner's residence, since it was rented out at the time of the sale.
Held: Judgment for petitioner; the statute was designed to aid cases
such as this and does not require actual occupation of the house at
the time of the sale. The decision is limited strictly to the facts of the
case. Ralph L. Trisko, 29 T.C. No. 59 (1957).
Pervading many of the nonrecognition sections of the Code is the
idea that where there is an exchange of property of a like kind, the
taxpayer's holdings have not substantially changed and he should not
be taxed on any gain from the exchange because his economic situ-
ation has not been changed.' While most of the nonrecognition sections
apply to exchanges only, Section 112(n) of the 1939 Code (renum-
28 riS. STAT. §241.18 (1955). "The sale, transfer, or assignment, in bulk, other-
wise than in the ordinary course of trade, and in the regular prosecution of
the business of the seller, transferor or assignor, of any part, or the whole, of
any stock of goods, wares and merchandise, or of the fixtures pertaining to
the same, or of such goods, wares and merchandise and fixtures, including
such sales, transfers and assignments made in consideration of an existing
indebtedness, shall be conclusively presumed to be fraudulent and void. ."Thus in Century Electric Co. v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 155, 159 (8th Cir.
1951), in discussing section 112, the general nonrecognition section in the
1939 Code, the Court stated:
"Subsection 112(b)(1) and 112(e) indicate the controlling policy
and purpose of the section, that is, the nonrecognition of gain or loss
in transactions where neither is readily measured in terms of money,
where in theory the taxpayer may have realized gain or loss but where
in fact his economic situation is the same after as it was before the
transaction."
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